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ABSTRACT 
THISESSAY REVIEWS THE ISSUES SURROUNDING determinations of the cred- 
ibility of online materials. The author argues, first, that the World Wide 
Web, and the larger Internet, comprise some very difficult and distinctive 
features that make conventional ways of assessing credibility adequate only 
within a fairly bounded frame; second, that beyond this bounded frame, 
standard credibility measures encounter some paradoxical and self-un- 
dermining consequences; third, that this picture is complicated further 
by the fact that “credibility” actually covers several very different sorts of 
factors, not all of them matters of judging truth and falsity per se; and 
therefore, fourth, that the assessment of credibility needs to address the 
social and normative factors that actually shape the character and quality 
of online information. These considerations combine to reveal an ethical 
dimension to many credibility assessments. 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most-discussed topics about the World Wide Web is how 
users can be expected to assess the credibility of information they find 
there. This is not surprising since a key feature of new networked infor- 
mation and communication systems is that the sources of information 
found online are sometimes difficult to ascertain. The Web seems to offer 
a global reference resource but, because of its very scope, it seems to over- 
whelm the ordinary conventions by which people informally judge the 
merit of what they read or hear. Teaching users how to become more 
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critical and discerning is an important educational objective for learners 
of all ages (Bruce, 2000; Burbules & Callister, 2000). 
Yet this goal is complicated by the fact that the Web is not an ordinary 
reference system; it poses some unique and, in many respects, unprec- 
edented conditions that complicate the task of sorting out dependable 
from undependable information-and even complicates the notion that 
we have a clear sense of that distinction. How to differentiate credible 
from fraudulent information is not a new problem, but unraveling these 
in the context of a vast rapidly changing networked system is. 
At a first level, the problems do not seem very different from more 
familiar text-based or oral contexts. Certainly we are making credibility 
judgments all the time: Is this person a reliable expert? Does this source 
have a bias or an axe to grind? Is this information outdated? Does this new 
information fit with what I already know about a topic? and so on. There 
are dozens of Web sites already devoted to assessing credibility, and they 
offer good sensible advice such as: Use the return address or URL to de- 
termine the source of the information. Check the “last updated” date to 
see if the information is current. Triangulate multiple sources of informa- 
tion before you believe something based on whatjust one source has told 
you. These are all well and good and, in a large number of cases, will 
suffice to sort out incorrect, misleading, incomplete, or deceptive infor- 
mation. For learners of a certain age, they are useful rules of thumb, and 
they are certainly better than nothing. But such standards fail as we con- 
sider issues of greater complexity and difficulty, and indeed at some point 
we realize that they lead us into a series of paradoxes that begin to :,hatter 
the notion of “credibility” itself. At that point we are thrown back to much 
more uncertain tentative methods by which to judge what we find on the 
Web. Yet this instability itself has something important to teach us about 
the nature of this new information and communication environment. 
Three conditions make the Web, and the larger Internet in which it 
operates, a different and challenging credibility context. First, there is 
the problem of sheer volume. A Web search could pull up thousands, or 
even millions, of “hits” to which one might further add newsgroups, 
listservs, and e-mail as sources of information on a topic. The numbers 
are overwhelming. Now, of course, a library can be Overwhelming too, as 
can dozens of news media sources (I write this in the midst of a close 
presidential campaign and, despite the importance of this subject, it is 
impossible to find clear unambiguous information on the status of the 
candidates-each poll gives conflicting numbers, every analysis argues that 
one or the other has an “edge” in the final election, every assessment of 
their proposals gives a different calculation of their fiscal costs and ben- 
efits, and so on). None of this seems very new. What is new is that the 
growth and decentered nature of the Web, and the larger Internet, has 
put the means of providing information in the hands of many more people. 
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Referencing and organizational systems that are available, for example, in 
libraries, do not exist here. The markers of institutional credibility and 
authority, the lines of tradition that allow viewers to judge media sources 
or publishers, for example, have not been settled yet. There is an even 
greater capacity to locate information that will tend to confirm one’s ex- 
isting views and prejudices rather than challenge them. In all this, the 
scope of the network and its deregulated content overwhelm the ordinary 
idea that we can comparatively judge different sources (which ones?), or 
that we can trust popular processes of selection to weed out the less cred- 
ible and give status to the survivors. 
Second, the Internet is, to a considerable degree, a self-sustaining ref- 
erence system-i.e., when we do try to judge the credibility of an informa- 
tion source, we frequently must rely on other information gleaned within 
the network. We find an article written by an academic group and we go to 
their university Web site to find out more about them; we find a claim on 
one Web page and we do a keyword search to see if similar information can 
be found elsewhere; we receive a rumor via e-mail and forward it to friends 
and associates to ask if they know whether it has substance or not. Again, 
often this will help us out and, in any event, it is frequently our only choice. 
But this self-supporting structure is rather like the problem of dictionar- 
ies-i.e., we look up the meaning of one word, it gives us another; we look 
up the meaning of that word, it gives us another; we look up the meaning of 
that word, and it gives us the first word we started with.When a referencing 
system operates only internally and has no separate external reference, the 
very assistance we seek merely leads us in circles within the network. Some- 
times credibility judgments online can be like this. 
The Web is also a self-supporting reference system in another sense. 
Because the central feature of the Web is the HTML link, the structure of 
links by which we access a Web resource, and the links it contains, pro- 
vides a major source for credibility judgments (Burbules, 1997). On the 
one hand, how we link to a page usually provides a primary criterion of 
whether we believe it or not-e.g., it was referred to us by a credible friend 
or colleague; it was linked to from an authoritative site; several other pages 
all point to this one reference; and so on. To compare this structure with 
footnotes (an imperfect comparison generally, but appropriate here) : if 
we find a book or an article cited favorably by other sources we respect, it 
is more likely to be found important and credible. On the other hand, 
Web pages typically contain links themselves, and we often judge the cred- 
ibility of a source by how reliable and complete its references seem to be 
to other sites. A site for news information that only includes links to other 
sites expressing a similar political point of view might be viewed as more 
credible (if one shares that political point of view) or less so (because it 
only presents one side of the issues). Here too the footnote comparison is 
fitting-if we know that there are important reference works in a field of 
444 LIBRARY TRENDS/WINTER 2001 
study, we judge new work by how well it anchors its claims to those stan- 
dard reference points. Credibility here depends on the pathways through 
which we have accessed the information and the pathways to which it points. 
The sort of structure described here is manifested, for example, in 
search engines that prioritize searches by ranking sites first that are most 
frequently linked to by other sites. It is manifested in commercial sites 
that tell, for example, book buyers that: “People who bought this book 
also bought. . . .” It is the core idea behind applications like VisIT, devel- 
oped at the University of Illinois, which allows one to organize multiple 
Web sites via their interlinking network structure, ascertaining which seem 
to be more “central” to an information cluster and which more peripheral 
(http://visitl .vp.uiuc.edu/) . This self-supporting nature creates valid 
opportunities to make some credibility judgments, but it also has the po- 
tential to lead those judgments astray, since the closed nature of this ref- 
erence system may simply mean that we are buttressing one flimsy source 
by linking it to another one. Unless we have some independent basis for 
assessing the quality of those associations (whether through our preexist- 
ing knowledge of a subject area or through some external-to-the-system 
standard for judging them), we may be in the position of a blindfolded 
person being led by the hand by a group of others, all of whom are also 
blindfolded. 
The third factor that makes the Web and the Internet so complicated 
and difficult from a credibility standpoint is the speed of its growth and 
the rate of dispersion with which information can circulate within it. Ev-
eryone who has spent time with this medium is familiar with the variety of 
hoaxes, rumors, urban legends, chain letters, and false virus reports that 
circulate rapidly, often forwarded by users (especially novice users) to their 
associates, thinking they are providing a useful service by spreading the 
information. As my colleague Chip Bruce, professor at the University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, states it, these become a kind ofvirus them- 
selves, reproduced geometrically and with great speed. In general, the 
more important something appears to be, the faster it spreads. Yet when 
these turn out to be false, the mechanisms for retracting or correcting 
their misrepresentations can never proceed as quickly or as broadly as the 
original dispersion. In some cases, this capacity is being used for outright 
fraud, as in false stories about stock offerings that can often result in sub- 
stantial short-term increases or decreases in their value; within a short 
time, even a few hours, such rumors might be detected and corrected, but 
the s a y  crooks have already taken their profits and vanished. 
And this introduces one of many paradoxes that impinge upon deter- 
minations of credibility online; often the most sophisticated and knowl- 
edgeable users are most likely to be taken in by such reports. Believing 
that they are getting “inside” information not available to the general 
public, such users are especially prone to being deceived by “obvious” 
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markers of credibility that-precisely because they are generally reliable 
indicators of credibility-are easily falsified by clever information-provid- 
ers with an eye toward deception. A similar example involves falsified Web 
sites for political candidates, often complete with plausible URLs and ap- 
parent testimonials from reliable sources; the truly dangerous ones are 
not those with obviously satirical or impugning content-e.g., “HowI Killed 
My Brother in Law,” “My Ten Steps for Conquering Canada.” A person 
with an eye toward real political damage would make the Web site scrupu- 
lously accurate, with actual speech transcripts, and so on, adding only a 
few subtle word changes, a doctored photo or two,a link to a bizarre fringe 
group, and so on. Disinformation like this actually uses your sophistica- 
tion against you; the bestjudges of credibility are most likely to be fooled. 
RECOGNIZING CREDIBLESOURCES 
How are we supposed to respond to this situation, and how can we 
help teach others to be more resistant to it? There are four elements typi- 
cally discussed in the credibility literature; each has a surface plausibility 
and range of usefulness and yet each is ultimately inadequate, even self- 
defeating, as a criterion or procedure. 
When examining the many Web sites dedicated to encouraging more 
critical or discerning consumption of Web information, they have almost 
identical content (and in many cases have clearly drawn from one an- 
other-an interesting credibility problem in itself). The first thing injudg- 
ing the credibility of a Web site is to look for markers or “proxies” of cred- 
ibility. These include observing the layout and visual quality of the site (if 
it is well-designed and carefully maintained, it is more likely to be from a 
serious source); reading the URL or return e-mail for content (is it from 
an academic or a commercial source, does the provider identify him or 
herself by name); does the information seem to come from an authorita- 
tive source or one with an obvious bias; does the date on the material 
show that it is “fresh” and frequently revised and updated; and so on. 
These indirect indicators have value but, as we have already seen, deceiv- 
ers are as aware of them as consumers are, and each can be falsified not 
only with an eye toward casual deception but as a way of taking in people 
even more profoundly. Moreover, these criteria, though widely shared, 
are far from unambiguous. Is an academic (.edu, .ed, or .ac) URL marker 
a clear sign of credibility? Academics tend to think so, but many people 
view it differently, seeing academic status as a marker of irrelevance, ab- 
straction, or arcania. There are also issues on which an academic identifi- 
cation might be viewed as a sign of special pleading by a self-interested 
constituency (e.g., tax policies) or of Left-wing partisanship. In other words, 
these criteria themselves rest upon additional judgments that are often 
tacit or unexamined, without which they may be extremely unreliable 
guides to judging information online. Yet the further one examines these 
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unquestioned assumptions, the more flimsy these criteria appear. Given 
the value that academic institutions place on the originality of ideas, there 
is a strong incentive for scholars to look for the unexamined angle of 
approach to a problem, the radical interpretation, the obscure detail el- 
evated to a masterstroke of brilliant insight, the replicated study that dis- 
proves a long-established “fact,” and so on. Certainly academic practices 
impose rigorous standards of scholarship, peer review, critical cross-test- 
ing by other scholars, and so on. Academic journals are one of the media 
that promote and protect such values. But there are simultaneous pres- 
sures toward novelty and academic status or visibility that also operate for 
many scholars, and which do not always promote participation in the criti- 
cal spirit of inquiry that presumably guarantees the credibility of academic 
work. None of this is apparent to those outside the academic context, so 
when an article comes from “Dr. Smith from Recondite State University,” 
its worth rests on an invisible set of norms and practices that even most 
academics tend to trust on faith; ordinary users don’t even know that those 
practices exist, let alone how imperfect they can be. 
A second set of responses, then, takes the opposite tack: be skeptical 
of everything found online; use multiple indicators of credibility, includ- 
ing those external to the source and not only those identified within it; 
triangulate specific claims by matching them with information available 
from independent sources (whether online or not); in general, do not 
believe anything that comes to you from only one source. Again, these are 
perfectly reliable rules of thumb. But they probably tend to exclude too 
much, and they require a degree of thoroughness that, realistically, few 
people will apply to every case. Determinations of credibility are not a 
perfectionist endeavor; they inevitably entail judgments about how much 
credibility one needs to support action or belief based on a particular 
claim, and this degree will generally vary depending on the seriousness of 
the consequences for that person of an error. But there are two kinds of 
error at work here (statistically termed Type I and Type I1 errors): the 
consequences of rejecting a true proposition can be just as devastating as 
the consequences of accepting a mistaken one-and nothing in lists of 
credibility criteria can help in balancing that determination. More strin- 
gent criteria may decrease the likelihood of making one kind of mistake 
at the cost of increasing the likelihood of making the other kind of mis- 
take. 
A third response, and probably one that most of us follow most often, 
knowingly or not, is simply to defer these judgments to others whom we 
entrust to make them on our behalf. Even search engines are making 
qualitative judgments about sources (different engines use different cri- 
teria), which are implicit in the rank ordering they establish when they 
post the results. Many users may not know that some search engines “sell” 
priority in their listings so that the criterion is based on commercial con- 
BURBULES/ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF CREDIBILITY 447 
cerns and not necessarily on the quality, reliability, or usefulness of the 
sites listed. Directories, whether partly automated or driven by human 
editors/archivists, often seek to establish “definitive” sites, selecting, evalu- 
ating, and organizing exemplary resources on some topic, and granting 
through this process a kind of derivative credibility (assuming, of course, 
that these editors/archivists are reliable judges of material themselves). I 
have already touched on the crucial role played by editors and publishers 
ofjournals, or other kinds of online publications, in screening and autho- 
rizing particular works as ,worthy of attention. All of these functions are 
perfectly recognizable to librarians, of course. It is far from an original 
insight to note that this whole process simply raises the question of cred- 
ibility at a level once-removed. Yet it is important to emphasize here that it 
is often difficult, if not impossible, to identify who these intermediaries 
actually are: it is natural to want the primary material to stand for itself 
and, by disposition, people in these sorts of roles are not interested in 
interjecting themselves as the focal points of attention. But as I hope to 
have made clear, without doing so, users are deprived of information about 
a crucial element in the credibility chain. At the same time, and in a man- 
ner similar to my second case mentioned earlier, the more “meta” such 
reflections become, the more that judgments on the credibility of the 
intermediaries and facilitators of access to information displace judgments 
on the credibility of that information itself, the more time users spend 
away from the things that they actually want and need; many will decide 
that it is not worth the time or will use very broad imperfect standards 
(e.g., “refereed publication”) to perform a kind of “information triage” 
for them-rapidly, crudely, but necessary given the volume of material to 
be worked through. 
A fourth related approach-one distinctly suited to the Web-is the 
formation of communities (“rings”) of like-minded people who share a 
common interest or concern. By linking their Web sites together and col- 
lectively screening the addition of new material, they pool their intelli- 
gence and expertise to make credibilityjudgments and to cross-check one 
another. This phenomenon is interesting both as an epistemic exercise 
and as an instantiation of social constructionism at work. However, obvi- 
ously it is imperfect since shared wisdom can also mean shared miscon- 
ceptions or biases. While less hierarchical and more democratic than rely- 
ing on invisible editor/archivists to make judgments on one’s behalf, this 
approach has the vices of its virtues. One might term this an instance of 
“distributed credibility” in that it displaces an individual judgment with a 
collective intelligence. It is, as I mentioned, particularly “Web-like” in its 
holistic approach to knowledge but also in its self-supporting and poten- 
tially self-reinforcing character. The greatest danger of such communi- 
ties, as with communities generally, is that they can become exclusionary, 
hostile to unconventional, or radical challenges to their presumptions and 
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practices (Burbules, 2000). From a credibility standpoint, this means that 
serious questioning-the kind of questioning that can only come from 
one “outside” a given epistemic framework-is less likely to occur, and it is 
more likely that over time the shared preconceptions of such communi- 
ties, even when they may have been originally valid, will eventually bo- 
come credibility blinders. 
What I have tried to show here is how the most common responses to 
credibility issues online, while valuable and reasonable within certain con- 
straints, ultimately turn out to be paradoxical and self-defeating. This does 
not make them useless, but it suggests a limit to how clear and reliable 
such credibility judgments can be. At some juncture they encounter a 
point of diminishing returns or, as Tenner (1996) calls them, “revenge 
effects” that actually counteract one’s purposes (pp. 5-6). 
DEFININGCREDIBILITY 
This discussion is complicated still further by the fact that “credibil- 
ity” means many different things, not only in the Web context but also 
generally. Normally it is taken as synonymous with “truth” or “believabil- 
ity” and is tied together with the epistemic problem of how information 
becomes knowledge. Certainly, the most striking examples of rumors and 
hoaxes online concern actual misinformation or disinformation intended 
to deceive others. But these concerns, important as they are, should not 
obscure other key dimensions that also impinge on judgments of “cred- 
ibility.” 
Such judgments also depend on assessments of what is usef.1, releuant, 
or interesting (and these are not all the same thing either). Given the vol- 
ume of online information, a major decision to be made is simply what to 
pay attention to and on what basis. The initial selection and screening, 
which I would call “the judgment of credibility,” is typically based more on 
one’s interests and concerns and whether this new item even potentially 
qualifies as worthy of attention. Giving over one’s attention is what starts 
the process of epistemic evaluation, but this way of putting it suggests that 
these are entirely separate processes. In practice, we may have already 
made tacit preliminary judgments of truthfulness as soon as we say, “this 
may be useful, relevant, or interesting.” Conversely, it may partly be be- 
cause we find something potentially useful, relevant, or interesting that 
we have an incentive to find it true. 
When we look at the role of intermediaries in the credibility process, 
we need to scrutinize them not only for their qualifications and their cri- 
teria for making epistemic judgments on our behalf but also, crucially, 
theirjudgments about what is useful, relevant, or interesting. This latter 
role is often underestimated, as can be seen, for example, with the news 
media (whether online scribes like the Drudge Report, or CNN and the 
BBC).The decisions they make about what and how much to tell us about 
BURBULES/ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF CREDIBILITY 449 
certain stories are based only partly on the value of truth-e.g., operating 
with limited time and a need to grab and hold viewers’ attention, sharp 
cuts are made in stories with an eye toward what viewers will find useful, 
relevant, or interesting. The New Ywk Timesslogan “All the News That’s Fit 
to Print” becomes “All the News That Fits,” often in a few-second sound 
bite. So here again the different dimensions of credibility cannot be di- 
vorced from one another. This becomes even more true when we reflect 
on the feedback effects of such decisions by the media (whether online or 
not)-i.e., their judgments3about what people will find useful, relevant, 
or interesting often shape, at least in part, what people actually do come 
to find useful, relevant, or interesting. This self-fulfilling influence makes 
it not only a consumer-driven determination but a consumer-shaping de- 
termination. And when these media are seen in the context of their in- 
creasingly intrusive commercial interests, this process can hardly fail to be 
viewed skeptically. 
Another dimension of credibility is timeliness. This is not only impor- 
tant in the ordinary sense that much information becomes obsolete or 
inaccurate with the passage of time, it is also because the Web is such a 
rapidly changing environment that material which does not appear to be 
continually revised and checked becomes suspect for no other reason than 
that the environment around it has been changing. Hence, many users 
expect a degree of ongoing novelty and innovation even just at the level 
of design or mode of representation, as an indication marker that the 
providers of information have been scrutinizing their content with a “fresh- 
ness date” in mind. This is hardly a new idea. In the novel The Leopard, 
Giuseppe di Lampedusa (1961) writes: 
a fact has scarcely happened five minutes before its genuine kernel 
has vanished, been camouflaged, embellished, disfigured, annihilated 
by imagination and self-interest; shame, fear, generosity, malice, op- 
portunism, charity, all the passions, good as well as evil, fling them- 
selves on the fact and tear it to pieces; very soon it has vanished alto- 
gether. (p. 219) 
Another dimension of credibility is comprehensiveness. The very volume and 
diversity of the Internet creates a peculiar credibility dilemma. One might 
term this Meno’s Paradox in reverse: How do you know what’s not there 
when you do not know what it is? The global scope of the Web can create 
the illusion that whatever cannot be found must not be very important. 
Yet even if everything one did find were important and true, it would be a 
significant failing from the standpoint of credibility if other information, 
representing contrasting or conflicting points of view, was not also avail- 
able. In part this is because, as noted earlier, having contrasting or con- 
flicting points of view is sometimes the only check on a kind of self-con- 
firming “obviousness” that beliefs can settle into, but it is also because 
many of the intermediaries, as we have seen, play their primary role through 
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selectiveness, a role we implicitly authorize for them. We want others to 
make decisions about priority and relevance; we don’t want the “full story” 
(whatever that means) in most cases. It would be tedious and distracting 
otherwise. But as soon as such selections are made-by others or by our- 
selves-the danger increases that something crucial has been overlooked. 
And without substantial independent knowledge of a subject area, it is 
impossible to find out, even with hindsight, what has been overlooked. 
The fact that such selections are absolutely necessary in the Web context 
only heightens the paradox: the selectivity we require for making certain 
kinds of credibility judgments conflicts with the comprehensiveness we 
require as a condition of other credibility judgments. 
Finally, these considerations lead to another paradox of cred- 
ibility, since sometimes too much comprehensiveness can itself be 
counterproductive to judgments of credibility. Credibility, as noted ear- 
lier, involvesjudgments about worth and notjust about truth per se. David 
Shenk (1997) argues that an excess of online information tends to pro- 
duce a “leveling” effect in which everything is viewed as equally plausible 
or implausible-i.e., for any point of view you can find a reasonably well- 
argued alternative view. How does one decide then which perspective to 
valorize? When reasonable arguments seem to pull in any one of several 
directions, does it matter which one we choose? This judgment typically 
will rely on value considerations beyond the force of argument itself; cred- 
ibility is not a purely epistemological assessment. 
CONCLUSION 
What this discussion has tried to show is that the standard criteria for 
judging credibility online are frustrated by the characteristic conditions 
of the World Wide Web and of the larger Internet. None of these ele- 
ments is entirely unique to the online context, but the scope, self-refer- 
encing character, and rate of change of this medium raise these issues to 
a new importance. The Web is both an information archive and a social 
network; as people move within this space, their interaction with ideas 
and information is, at the same time, an interaction with other individuals 
or groups (even though the implications of such social dynamics for what 
is and isn’t found online are not always made apparent). The analysis 
here has tried to make such implications more apparent. Moreover, cred- 
ibility is not just one thing, and judgments about it inevitably bring in 
considerations that are not purely matters of assessing knowledge claims. 
At this point credibility can be seen to take on an ethical dimension. 
The idea of distributed credibility suggests that the reliability ofjudg- 
ments about the truth of information-and even more sojudgments about 
usefulness, relevance, interest, or worth-cannot be assessed outside the 
nature of the online communities of which one is (overtly or tacitly) a 
part, nor of the communities producing and legitimizing the information 
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found online. These collective sentiments, with all their wisdom and in- 
sight, all their biases and exclusions, shape the content of information, 
shape the standards by which it is judged, and shape the negative spaces, 
the absences, of what is not to be found there. These social judgments 
and processes are structured by values of collectivity, reciprocal obliga- 
tion, inclusiveness or exclusiveness, and so on-moral values, not prima- 
rily epistemic ones. Hence judging information is always partly judging 
other values with which one is choosing to identify or to challenge. A key 
element in these judgments, I have suggested, is the permeability of such 
communities to questions or challenges from alternative points of view; 
some, like gated communities in our physical neighborhoods, define them- 
selves centrally by what they exclude; others, like communities of open de- 
bate and free inquiry, invite and even seek out alternative perspectives 
because they believe that this is how knowledge is best formed and tested- 
but also, and inseparably from this belief, because this is how they choose 
to shape the world in which they live. That is a moral stance as well. 
On the issue of what I described as Type I and Type I1 errors, no 
epistemic criteria are going to inform the decision about whether it is 
better to run the risk of mistakenly accepting a false proposition or mis- 
takenly rejecting a true one. Such a judgment cannot be made once and 
for all time; the importance of the problem, the consequences of error, 
and upon whom those consequences may fall, all impinge on the way this 
choice will be decided in particular cases. Determinations of risk, in such 
instances, clearly raise moral questions, and it is crucial to see that, whether 
decided overtly or taken for granted, judgments of this sort implicate the 
process of inquiry in a process of social responsibility. 
On the issue of bow “meta” our reflections on online information 
should be-that is, how deeply to investigate the sources of information, 
their qualifications, their procedures of testing and confirmation for what 
they put out as fact-the ideal of perfectionism in such matters runs up 
against realities of limited time and limited available information. At some 
point we need to move back down from the meta level and get the infor- 
mation we were originally looking for. This means that, at some point, 
judgments rely on attributions of trust-trust in individuals, trust in com- 
munities and collective (if largely invisible) processes of vetting informa- 
tion. Here again we encounter moral elements: fostering such relations 
creates, in networked environments especially, fibers of affiliation that 
strengthen and reinforce one another. For example, if one visits a Web 
site frequently for information because one judges it to be reliable, one 
contributes to granting it a higher priority when search engines rank it 
for the searches of others-they are bound up with one’s own choices, 
whether they choose to be or not, and their participation with these sites, 
in turn, reinforces the reputation of credibility that the site acquires. This 
may not have been one’s intention, but the unspoken, and unquestioned, 
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attributions of trust that are implicit in these networked dynamics intro- 
duce a problem that demands moral reflection. 
On the issue of “information triage,” the notion of epistemic perfec- 
tionism takes an even stronger hit: credibility models that are based on 
the ideal of scrupulous testing and comparison fall up against practices of 
inquiry that, for most users most of the time, simply do not work that way 
and cannot. The need for selectivity, and the general expectation of‘speed 
and efficiency in online searches, dictate that users either make fairly rapid 
choices or leave those determinations up to others. The criteria by which 
such accommodations get made involve all kinds of assumptions, prefer- 
ences, and blind spots-but any alternative set of criteria would also in- 
volve assumptions, preferences, and blind spots, simply different ones. 
Deciding how much time to spend on credibility testing, then, is not itself 
a credibility issue but a matter of values and priorities that bring in other 
considerations (for example, I am typing the first draft of this paper with 
my infant son asleep on the couch next to me; even as I make revisions 
and try to improve the paper’s arguments, its credibility, it will always bear 
the marks of having been written with one ear perked, listening for his 
movement or discomfort-the same would be true if I were searching for 
information online). 
On the issue of timeliness and the erosion of “facts,” I recommend an 
exercise for you, which comes from Bob Panoff of the Shoder Education 
Foundation: search the Web for the boiling point of radium. You will find 
dramatically different figures, all from sites that appear legitimate and 
credible (the first four I found had four different temperatures). Since 
there is no way (I  assume) for you to ascertain the fact of the matter for 
yourself, how will you decide which site to believe? If this is true for some- 
thing that is assumed to be (a) an objective and scientific fact and (b) 
constant, since whatever the boiling point is presumably isn’t going to 
change, how much more difficult will it be for other sorts of “facts” to be 
verified? For information with a stronger social or political dimension, it 
is clear that variations in empirical claims will be inevitably wrapped up 
with social or political values or assumptions, and where these claims con- 
flict, as they inevitably will in a vast, networked, information environment, 
how could normative values and commitments not be a factor in deciding 
what/who will be believed? 
Finally, on the issue of what Shenk (1997) calls the leveling effect of 
too much and too eclectic a pool of information, the greatest danger, as 
noted, is that one will simply choose to accept information that plausibly 
confirms one’s prior beliefs or what one wishes were true. None of us can 
be entirely immune to this weakneys but, to the extent that credibility 
judgments are recognized as having an ethical element, the consequences 
of doing so, for ourselves and for others, can at least be brought to the 
surface. 
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And that, in the end, is what I am arguing for here. The notions that 
credibility judgments can be made on objective criteria, that they only 
involve considerations impinging on the truth or falsity of information, 
and that one should always exercise such judgments as scrupulously as 
possible, all neglect the underlying characteristic of the networked envi- 
ronment in which thesejudgments are being made, namely, that it com- 
prises-constitutes, even-communities of obligation and commitment. 
The social dimensions of this network always entail elements ofjudgment 
and value. In the end, the best safeguard is to check one’s judgments 
against the judgments of a community with which one has confidence; 
choosing that reference group prudently is as much a moral matter, in- 
volving issues of respect and trust, as a matter of expertise. 
As noted throughout this discussion, these ethical elements, along 
with the fundamentally complex and conflicted nature of whatjudgments 
about “credibility” actually involve, combine to make such judgments far 
more indeterminate and provisional than they are normally taken to be. 
In a context where epistemic perfectionism must take its place alongside 
many other values that frequently override it, credibility, in the sense it is 
often meant, often may not be able to be independently established at all. 
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